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Abstract
Ca®µ e's pursuit of a more humane society is strictly related to his view of the economy as a human construction within
a more encompassing historical process. Based on this view, he conceives of economics as a policy-oriented social
science where value judgments play a crucial role. They frame the questions that need to be answered in order to
carry out purposeful change. They also structure the analysis, thus the way questions are answered. A commonly
shared understanding of the economy is, therefore, unlikely. Although this would seem to undermine Ca®µ e's view that
a \reasonable core" in economic thought exists, the paper { based on methodological premises that di®er, to some
extent, from those of Ca®µ e - contends that disciplinary dialogue remains possible provided economists acknowledge
the need to make their methodological value judgments explicit.
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In 1982 Federico Ca®µ e published an article on an Italian newspaper1. Although it was less than 700
words long, it provided a clear view of Ca®µ e's general approach to economics. What Ca®µ e argued
was that dominant ideologies assume either that nothing can be changed or that change requires the
radical subversion of the system, what Ca®µ e ironically referred to as a \revolutionary palingenesis"2.
Ca®µ e's alternative - reformist { view, which was greatly inspired by Keynes, was that it is possible
and necessary to pursue a \possible civilization".
`Possible' acquires a twofold meaning, in Ca®µ e's approach. On the one hand it is the opposite of
`impossible': it denies that the status quo cannot be changed. On the other, it means `practicable'
in a complex world. The task for whoever wishes to change the status quo is to deal with a manifold
set of problems. These include misleading views of the world we live in as well as vested interests.
Change requires, in this perspective, an idea of what a better world should be and the awareness
that each step towards that better world involves a multi-tier action: ethical, technical and cultural.
Practicability means identifying a set of day by day actions to this end.
A reformist is one who provides the ideas that will eventually allow change to occur. Unfortu-
nately, it is easier to deny the possibility of a step by step transformation of society than to pursue
it. This is what dooms the reformist to a minority role. This is what the solitude of the reformist is
about. Despite this solitude, Ca®µ e is unwilling to forsake reformism. He concludes his article with
a famous citation from Keynes (1973 [1936], 383-4).
In the ¯eld of economic and political philosophy there are not many who are in°uenced by new
theories after they are twenty-¯ve or thirty years of age, so that the ideas which civil servants and
politicians and even agitators apply to current events are not likely to be the newest. But, soon or
late, it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good or evil.
The aim of this paper is to discuss the issues that Ca®µ e raises and to assess their relevance today,
more than twenty years after he left us. It will do so by focusing on three major issues: the meaning
of \a possible civilization"; the reason why such a goal may seem to be unpalatable; the prospect
that it may cease to be so. My contention is that, although many circumstances may determine the
solitude of the reformist, at least one of them may be overcome. I refer to what I believe remained
an open issue in Ca®µ e's approach, namely the role that value judgements have in the depiction of a
possible civilization.
I deem it appropriate to clarify that my attempt is not to state what Ca®µ e `really' said. I
believe he provided insights that gave rise to new questions. These questions do not lead us into a
dead end, nor do they relate to ¯elds of inquiry other than the economist's. Quite to the contrary,
they have been addressed by other scholars. My attempt therefore is, if possible, to establish some
connections3 in the hope that they may clarify why we still have much to learn from Ca®µ e's view of
the economy and of economics.
2 Many Possible Worlds
A reformist is someone who wishes to change the economy and/or society in order to make it a better
place to live in. Let us leave aside, for the time being, what `better' means and who is supposed to
de¯ne it, and focus on whether and how it is possible to achieve such a goal.
1\The solitude of the reformist", in Il manifesto, January 29, 1982. The article is also in Caffµ e (1990, 3-5), in
Caffµ e (2007a, 383-4) and in Caffµ e (2007b, 81-82).
2Keynes 1963 [1925] { one of Ca®µ e's major points of reference - labeled these two ideologies respectively \die-hard
conservatives" and \party of catastrophe".
3\The conceptual basis for this view of knowledge is the notion of a system as a set of elements and an incomplete
set of connections between them; thus not only di®erent sets of elements but also di®erent ways of connecting a given
set of elements de¯ne di®erent systems." (Loasby 2005, 59)
1From a conventional4 perspective the way to answer this question is to draw on the division of
labor between positive and normative analysis. The aim of the former is to provide a consistent
account of how the economy works. The aim of the latter is to derive normative prescriptions from
it. In this perspective, `possible' relates to the compatibility between desired change and economic
constraints.
The conventional perspective provides two notions of a `better' place to live in. The ¯rst one is
centered on e±ciency: better involves a shift from the economy as it actually is towards the `optimal'
con¯guration of the economy5: this is the typical market failure approach where `better' involves an
improvement in terms of Paretian e±ciency6. The second notion is centered on equity. It relates
to distribution. The problem with equity, however, is that it involves an explicit value judgment
concerning who is to gain and who is to lose from a given price structure and, consequently, from
a possible redistribution. Another problem with equity is that redistribution may involve a cost in
terms of e±ciency. The assessment of the trade o® between e±ciency and equity ultimately depends
on a value judgment.
The e±ciency-based notion of `better' is fairly trivial, at least if one is willing to believe that
only the gains and losses of isolated individuals matter and they can be identi¯ed. Indeed, anyone
is willing to accept a situation where someone gains something and nobody loses anything. The
real issue is whether Pareto improvements are what is really relevant. Hence, on the grounds
that distribution cannot be forsaken, Ca®µ e (1984) recalls Bruno De Finetti's remark that a Pareto
optimum may be optimal but it needn't be good.
So the second notion of better cannot be left aside. Equity is a crucial matter and any notion
of a possible civilization must take it into account. Under these circumstances, however, a possible
civilization must comply with two constraints. The ¯rst one is technical: the e±ciency-equity trade
o® must not be such as to preclude change. The second one is `political': value judgments must be
in favor of the envisaged change.
The di±culties related to value judgements are fairly straightforward, although I will need to
return to them further on. The nature of the technical constraints, instead, must be discussed. If
economics was a hard science, it would be possible to identify these constraints once and for all.
The policy maker might have to adapt them to the historical context but the conditions for change
would be fairly clear. Despite the existence of many economic theories, they would all relate to a
unique reality.
This is not Ca®µ e's view, however. According to Ca®µ e, there is more to public policy than the mere
identi¯cation of speci¯c solutions to practical issues within a given economic context. Ca®µ e explicitly
refers to A.C.L. Day's (1955) discussion of the single universe approach provided by Friedman, and
his remark that, quite to the contrary, more than one world is possible. Given \the immense range
of possibilities of the future." (Day in Ca®µ e 1971b, 23)7, the scope for a theory of public policy is
de¯nitely broader. According to Ca®µ e (1971b, 23)
The e®ort ... [of] the researcher ... is to resort to the available tools and techniques of
analysis in order to provide an outline of the constellation of possible economic situations, which
are schematically depicted, thereby abstracting from the greater complexity associated to concrete
situations.
The reason why more than one world is possible depends on at least three important circum-
stances. The ¯rst one is that the world we live in, thus the economy as a part of this world, is
not the outcome of deterministic mechanisms. It is a human creation. Ca®µ e is extremely critical of
the recurrent attempt to \reduce economics to a `half-science', taking account exclusively of tech-
4`Conventional' refers to what is broadly considered the mainstream. In Section 5 I will qualify the de¯nition by
referring to assumptions concerning systemic openness/closure.
5The `second best' theorem shows that closer needn't mean better but the perfect con¯guration remains the policy
maker's point of reference.
6If unemployment is viewed as the outcome of a macroeconomic market failure (Acocella 1998), aggregate demand
management policies may be considered as Pareto improvements and encompassed in this framework.
7All translations from Italian texts are the author's.
2nological relations and doing away with its subjective and psychological aspects." (Ca®µ e 1981, 79).
Drawing on one of his most eminent and authoritative teachers, Ca®µ e recalls that \Leaving aside
all understatements and with his typical epistemological acumen, Gustavo Del Vecchio referred to
these approaches as a reductive transformation of economic science into a more or less elaborated
accounting system." (ibid.). Thus, the theory of economic policy relates less to the compliance to
given constraints than to a proactive behavior that aims to assess and, if necessary, change those
very constraints: \Neglect of an essential feature of economic science { i.e. that it is motivated and
purposive - means that one is engaging in another science." (ibid.).
The second circumstance is that economic choice cannot always be separated from other choices.
Economic outcomes are the combined e®ect of market and non-market considerations. Consider, in
this regard, social costs. Ca®µ e (1978, 46-47) stresses that, despite e®orts to provide a quantitative
assessment of social costs, in many cases they just cannot be measured in purely monetary terms:
there are consequences of economic activity that need to be assessed in terms of criteria other than
market values. This implies that when Ca®µ e refers to a \motivated and purposive" economics, what
he has in mind is a range of choices that include societal values which transcend the market. This
obviously broadens the scope for economic policy.
The third circumstance is that the economy is embedded in a more general historical process.
This does not only mean that the economy evolves. Given the above discussion, its evolution is the
outcome of an interaction with the rest of society. Economic development cannot be reduced to a
mechanistic process because at every point in time a range of choices is possible based on di®erent
decision criteria: \A single-exit outcome can be contrasted by re°ecting on what history teaches us
{ that a multidirectionality of e®ects ultimately provides responsible human decisions with a wide
range of choices." (Ca®µ e 1970a, 70).
Given the importance of this issue it is worthwhile to brie°y elaborate on it. Ca®µ e does not
conceive of history just as a determinant of exogenous variables (e.g. technology or preferences) and
of shocks associated to these variables. He does not believe that it all amounts to circumstances that
interfere with the way the economy functions, much like a comet may disrupt the orderly movements
within the solar system. He views it as the evolving process of a human (and natural) society that
encompasses the economy.
Ca®µ e is aware that abstract theories and models are necessary in order to carry out economic
inquiries. However, owing to his view that extra-economic variables interact with the economy,
thereby a®ecting the way it evolves over time, he stresses that the gap between that abstractness
and what is required for its application to the world \as it is" raises some non-trivial problems. For
instance, in his discussion of Timbergen's contribution to the theory of economic policy, he points
out that
There is no doubt that, if Timbergen's model were handled incautiously, it might lend itself to the
naÄ ³ve expectation that the measures of economic policy ... can be identi¯ed at once on the basis of
the computational results provided by modern computers. The process that shapes economic policy
will never be reducible, obviously, to a mere counting of equations and unknowns.
(Ca®µ e 1971b, 187)8.
This same view leads to the conclusion that there cannot be a once and for all model of the
economy. This leads Ca®µ e continuously to lay emphasis { in applied analysis9 as well as in theoretical
debate10 - on the gap between existing theories of the capitalist economy and the capitalist economy
8Ca®µ e is also careful to note that Timbergen himself stated, in his The Design of Development, that programming
cannot substitute common sense but should supplement it (Caffµ e 1971b, 187).
9In an important paper on the stock market, Caffµ e (1971a) contends that \The shortcomings of the ¯nancial/stock
market, ..., should not be ascribed to fortuitous circumstances or to institutional °aws but to an intrinsic disequilib-
rium of the capitalist economy as it has historically developed." (160-1; my emphasis) and goes on to argue that \if the
way the [¯nancial] market should operate is fairly clear, the analysis of how it actually operates is today characterized
by mutually inconsistent views, which are likely to depend on persistent gaps in our knowledge" (172; my emphasis).
10When asked to comment on a paper by Sen (1985) where the latter provides an outline of the shortcomings of
the market, Caffµ e (1986) polemically contrasts Sen's ahistorical approach with Hicks' (1969) treatment of how the
3\as it has historically developed"11.
.
3 Beyond Buckets
The previous section argued that, according to Ca®µ e, it is possible to envisage many possible worlds.
This changes the scope for public policy. Its function is not just to mend a malfunctioning market.
It is to achieve a better society, if possible. How policy can pursue such an end is a di®erent issue
than the conventional market-centered one. Let us examine it in greater detail by going back to
equity.
The intuition of the conventional view is that, in general12, `too much' equity tends to prevent
the market from functioning properly, which implies that, all other things given, less output will
be produced. Okun's (1975) leaky bucket metaphor visualizes the limit to redistribution: the more
money you transfer to those in need, the more will be lost on its way and the less will be available to
the community as a whole. In order to choose appropriately, you must assess the trade o® between
the equity goal and e±ciency. The trade o® determines the burden that the community must bear
in order to achieve its equity goals.
What is not clear, in Okun's metaphor, is why we need a bucket in the ¯rst place. Conceptually,
it is fairly easy to determine the trade o® once we formulate the coeteris paribus assumption. The
problem, however, is whether such an assumption is legitimate. In fact what it involves is not only
that a market is required to achieve output. It also involves that a very speci¯c market is required:
the existing one. So it is reasonable to ask: Is it the only arrangement we can resort to? Wouldn't
it be possible to change the economy so that we would not need the bucket?
The claim that this is how things are { or, more rigorously, that we need to take account of
constraints as they have come to being over time - can be defended on the grounds that policy
cannot change all of the above circumstances at once. This may be true in the short run but it is
most unlikely to be true in general. According to Ca®µ e, an economist should transcend the status
quo in order to identify possible solutions to relevant issues. In this perspective, Ca®µ e (1971b, 44)
stresses that inquiries pointing to some appropriate action should be carried out independently of
whether policy makers request them or not, even though it is the latter who will eventually have to
decide whether to carry them out. In other terms, an economist should be free of the constraints
that the `counselor of the Prince' is subject to13.
Alternatively, the claim in favor of the status quo may be defended on the grounds that policy
must not a®ect it because it is the outcome of e±cient choices. But this leads us to a dog chasing its
tail: e±cient choices re°ect given circumstances; if the given circumstances were di®erent, e±cient
choices would di®er just as well14. So even if the status quo were to re°ect e±cient choices, these
would be the outcome of only one out of many possible technological and institutional setups. Thus,
a more appropriate way to frame the choice issue is to consider a two-tier process: the ¯rst tier
relates to the choices that economic actors make, the other relates to the choice contexts that those
actors must choose from15. The decision over which choice context is to be preferred depends on
distribution, so that \the analysis itself does not lead to the identi¯cation of an absolute maximum
market emerged historically, \where emphasis is laid on the empirical process of its formation, rather than on the
moral merits that may be assigned, or denied, to it." (Caffµ e 1986, 29).
11Tiberi (1997, 133) stresses this point by referring to Ca®µ e's epistemological background as based on \a sort of
`absolute historicism', that is necessary to look at the things of this world, far from any providentialism or metaphysical
determinism".
12The ideal but unlikely case being when the Second Welfare Theorem applies and it is possible to separate equity
from e±ciency so that the trade o® is nul.
13Commenting on Timbergen's approach, Caffµ e (1971b, 185) points out that \in terms of its ¯nal ends, economic
analysis does not have, therefore, ... a task of passive acceptance of externally ¯xed desiderata, but also a positive
function, one of clari¯cation, of critical assessment and of innovative incitement."
14Firms may e±ciently choose how to produce something both when child labour is legal and when it is not. The
techniques of production that they use may di®er and the output they produce may not be the same in the two
instances but the (maximizing) rationale underlying the behavior of the ¯rms remains the same.
15For simplicity's sake, in what follows we leave aside issues concerning incomplete information, bounded rationality
or the inconsistency between individual and collective rationality.
4for the collectivity, but to a maximum relative to the initial resource endowment." (Ca®µ e 1971b,
119; emphasis in the original).
Note that a choice context does not only a®ect potential choice within a given market. It
determines the very boundaries of that market. Pollution, for instance, can be conceived of as a
tradable good { thereby implying that a market for such a good should be enhanced - rather than
being forbidden because of the lexicographic preferences of society. Similarly, a range of goods and
services can be provided through mechanisms other than contracted exchange (e.g. a public health
service or a public education system), so that redistribution and solidarity substitute the rationale
of the market16.
A choice context therefore depends not only on how the market is organized but on the more
general organization of the economy. The latter may involve the establishment of non-market eco-
nomic activities like the welfare state. Activities that would not be pro¯table for private actors
may be carried out because they comply with non-market societal requirements { as in the case of
the assistance to the socially disadvantaged or the maintenance of common goods such as natural
environments. Depending on values that may well transcend the market, these activities may be
di®erently framed within the institutions of society: the unemployed, for instance, may be entitled {
that is, have the right - to a share of the community's income rather than be deprived of such a right
and be subject to the discretionary action of the Salvation Army or of some other charity17. Simi-
larly, depending on the peculiar relation established between the economy and society as a whole,
the environment, money or the labor force { workers { may or may not be treated as (¯ctitious)
commodities (Polanyi 1944). Ultimately, all these con¯gurations of the economy lead to di®erent
distributional arrangements. They a®ect resource allocation in ways that cannot be disregarded
when the key concern is to determine a more humane society.
The implication of the above discussion is that the notion of a trade o® between equity and
e±ciency is misleading because it assumes that there is only one possible choice context. Quite
to the contrary, a variety of contexts is possible depending on the rules that regulate the market.
The rules do not relate to the choice between e±ciency and equity but to the choice among di®erent
equity-related arrangements, each of which is open to an e±cient outcome. A closer look at the issue
suggests that the market { the section of the economy centered on contracted exchange - is only
one of the means to achieve the goals set out by society. The criteria that underlie other sections of
the economy, such as the family, non-pro¯t organizations, the welfare state, etc. { Polanyi's (1957)
redistribution and reciprocity - are neither e±cient nor ine±cient. They simply re°ect altogether
di®erent priorities.
The above discussion broadens the scope for economic policy. It is not restricted to improving
the performance of the market but it must determine the role that the market must play in the
pursuit of goals that transcend market priorities. The question this leads to is what may constrain
the pursuit of these non-market-speci¯c goals. This is the topic of the next section.
4 Arguing About Value Judgments
The previous section argued that `many possible worlds' can be envisaged depending on what rights
are assigned to whom, within the market and beyond the market. Since there are a great variety of
potential setups, there is no unique trade o® between e±ciency and social goals, because e±ciency
can be achieved with any prede¯ned institutional setup.
It may nonetheless be necessary to decide what `possible world' should be pursued. Apparently
we are back to the original trade o® but the situation is fairly di®erent. First, distribution is not
conceived of as a non-economic issue that unwontedly breaks into the economic scene, interfering
with the allocation of resources. Ca®µ e (1971b, 113-4) stresses this point by citing I.M.D. Little who
contends that \We do not believe that any de¯nition of an increase in wealth, welfare, e±ciency, or
real social income which excludes income distribution is acceptable." (Little 1950, 93-4). Second,
16These issues are discussed in greater detail by Schmid (1987) and Bromley (1989).
17Caffµ e (1956, xiv-xv) explicitly refers to the suggestions made by E.R. Walker (1943) and T.W. Hutchinson
(1938), concerning the determination of \minimal standards in living conditions and ... the methods that should be
deployed (in production and in distribution) to ensure them to all the members of a community.".
5there are no `broken buckets'. Resources need not be wasted: they can simply be used in di®erent
manners. Thus, what is at issue is not the economy versus social (`non-economic') requirements but
the `best' way to arrange the economy. Third, precisely because the issue is not to meet an equity
requirement with a given institutional setup but to change the latter in order to make it consistent
with the former, economic policy does not follow economic analysis: it is an intrinsic part of it.
Both economic policy and economic analysis depend on what questions are deemed relevant. Both
require answers that depend on assumptions { concerning features of `the world we live in' - deemed
reliable. The relevance of the questions and the appropriateness of the assumptions both depend on
value judgments18.
It is appropriate to note that value judgments make their entrance in two situations: when a
policy maker has to formulate his choice, and when an economist formulates the questions she aims
to answer. While the former situation is generally acknowledged to be standard practice, in that it
is the policy maker's business to choose on behalf of the community, quite a few scholars may have
problems in accepting the latter because it gives economic inquiry a subjective nature that clashes
with the desire for objectivity in science. The question is whether a common ground is possible or
views depend on idiosyncratic viewpoints alone.
What is at issue is that there is no unique way to frame a problem, and it is up to the scholar
to judge how to frame it. The reason why this is so is that knowledge includes not only statements
that are true or false but also statements that may be more or less plausible but are not certain.
Avoiding the latter may favor preciseness but at the expense of relevance19. Di®erent views of the
world { i.e. di®erent views both of how things are and of how they ought to be { lead to di®erent
value judgments concerning relevance. In turn these di®erent value judgments imply that a single
issue may be approached in a variety of ways.
Ca®µ e did not consider this variety to be a drawback. He often recalled a remark by Samuelson
(1974) to the e®ect that eclecticism in economics is a necessity. Di®erent perspectives provide
di®erent insights and help to clarify all aspects of an issue. Scienti¯c dialogue is nevertheless possible,
because logical rigor allows the economist to make explicit all the assumptions that underlie a given
inquiry, thereby identifying incontrovertible statements, isolating subjective views and, consequently,
pointing out the issues that do remain controversial. This is precisely how Ca®µ e discusses economic
theory, an example being his reconstruction (in Ca®µ e, 1971b, chapter 4) of the debate on the relation
between e±ciency and distribution in welfare economics.
In order for progress to occur, however, it must be possible { at least potentially { to settle open
issues. If ideas are to prevail over vested interests, it is reasonable to believe that sooner or later
they have to be commonly understood and shared.
Let us consider three types of open issues. The ¯rst one has to do with unsolved logical problems.
A typical case is when a theory is proved to be internally inconsistent. Ca®µ e did not seem to consider
this a major problem. Although he was obviously aware that internal consistency matters, he also
knew that the history of science is replete with formal solutions that come long after the original
intuition, e.g. Fermat's Last Theorem. Indeed, he was very dubious of scholars who thought that a
theory could be dismissed just because of its logical °aws20.
The second case has to do with value judgments. In particular, it is concerned with moral
value judgments, i.e. those that relate to moral statements. The conventional approach to moral
value judgments in economics is that there is no arguing about tastes or, as the traditional Latin
18Ca®µ e criticizes Robbins for his distinction between positive and normative economics on the grounds that \this
view, whereby the need of `an end, of a general scope' should arise at a certain point of economic inquiry, rather than
being an integral part of it, is hardly convincing in the light of the most subtle analyses carried out recently on the
role and function of human ideals in scienti¯c research" (Caffµ e 1971b, 28). In a footnote that follows this passage,
Ca®µ e brie°y refers to Myrdal's treatment of value judgements as an intrinsic part of economic inquiry.
19In an essay included in Caffµ e (1956), Little (1949) contends that \little can be gained by attempts to be
objective and precise about a subject in which people have an ethical interest, and about which they speak in terms
which, in so far as they have any descriptive meaning, are essentially vague." (I.M.D. Little, 1949, 245-6). See also
Ca®µ e's own remarks in Caffµ e (1956, xiv).
20\There are various ways to deal with the construction of economic science and with the contribution of those
who were its major creators. ... There is an approach that does not limit itself to assigning a privileged nature to
a speci¯c conception, but deems it necessary for a `demolitionist's' action to dismantle, once and for all, approaches
that have nevertheless constituted an integral part in the march of economic science." (Caffµ e, 1978, 17).
6saying puts it: De gustibus non est disputandum. Traditionally, the claim is that you cannot argue
over someone's preference for meat rather than cheese. Based on the presumed parallel between
the natural sciences and morals, \what agreement there is between attitudes seems merely a brute
fact, irrelevant to morals, and disagreement seems utterly inarbitrable by reason, bridgeable only by
propaganda, arm-twisting, or emotional manipulation." (Taylor 1993, 213).
In a reassessment of this approach, entitled with the Latin saying cited above, Becker and Stigler
(1977) deal with the fairly commonplace objection that people apparently do switch from one good
to another. They distinguish between commodities { what households consume { and market goods,
which are only a component of commodities. Households produce commodities \with market goods,
their own time, their skills, training and other human capital, and other inputs." (ibid., 77). On
these grounds, Becker and Stigler argue that, while people may actually switch from one market
good to another, their preference for commodities remains nonetheless the same.
Becker and Stigler are extremely lucid about the scope of their paper. While the nature of
their hypothesis \does not permit of direct proof because it is an assertion about the world, not a
proposition in logic" (ibid., 76), the rationale of their paper is to \apply standard economic logic as
extensively as possible" (ibid., 89; my emphasis), which amounts to tracing economic behavior back
to its key determinants. According to this foundationalist { or reductionist - perspective
knowledge claims are to be checked, to be assessed as fully and responsibly as they can be,
by breaking them down and identifying their ultimate foundations, as distinct from the chain of
inferences which build from these towards our original unre°ecting beliefs.
(Taylor 1993, 213; my emphasis).
Insofar as these ultimate foundations are \a brute fact", there seems to be no ground for a
convergence in value judgments. Even if logical problems were eventually to be solved, this would
not be enough to provide for a common understanding { not to speak of sharing - of those ideas
which, as we saw above, are what is really relevant for Keynes and Ca®µ e. If there is a way out of
this stalemate, it requires a di®erent approach to value judgments.
Hirschman (1984) provides an alternative treatment of the value judgment issue. Drawing on
Sen (1982), he distinguishes between preferences and values. More speci¯cally, Hirschman (1984,
89) argues that
men and women have the ability to step back from their `revealed' wants, volitions, and pref-
erences, to ask themselves whether they really want these wants and prefer these preferences, and
consequently to form meta-preferences that may di®er from their preferences.
The key issue, here, is that, while you may be unable to argue about a preference { e.g. whether
you like meat more than cheese - you can argue about a meta-preference, e.g. whether it is right to
kill animals in order to eat their meat.
The di®erence between the conventional approach and Hirschman's re°ects a di®erent methodol-
ogy. According to the conventional approach, there is no point in assuming that a con°ict may arise
between preferences and values (meta-preferences) because it is the former that underlie the latter.
Any attempt to identify other causes, aside from what are generally named `exogenous shocks',
would be unsatisfactory from a scienti¯c point of view and ultimately \unilluminating", as Becker
and Stigler would say21.
The title of Hirschman's essay - Against Parsimony: Three Easy Ways of Complicating Some
Categories of Economic Discourse { clearly claims that attempts at extreme simpli¯cation, as with
the foundationalist research program, do not allow for a clear understanding of economic phenomena.
His suggestion is exactly the opposite: to cross boundaries. Thus, rather than tracing a common
21\ ... from the foundationalist perspective, only the apodeictic mode of reasoning is really satisfactory; the appeal
to shared fundamental commitment seems simply a recourse to common prejudices. The very Enlightment notion of
prejudice encapsulates this negative judgment." (Taylor 1993, 213).
7determinant for preferences and values, he tries to account for the di®erences that exist between
them.
Although Hirschman focuses on the value system of individuals and makes no attempt to identify
a value principle for the community as a whole, he does suggest that, since values can be questioned,
a convergence may occur. If \men and women have the ability to ... ask themselves whether
they really want these wants" there is more opportunity for dialogue. This may not assure that a
convergence is always possible but it does avoid precluding it from the very outset.
My intention, here, is not to provide an exhaustive treatment of the literature on value judgments.
I merely wish to point to the key assumptions concerning how people formulate moral value judg-
ments. Questioning a preference involves assessing it according to some criterion. If the questioning
process is not just one of internal consistency, i.e. aligning the preference with its corresponding
value, the criterion must be independent of the preference itself. So the issue is where such a crite-
rion could possibly come from. This leads us to the third open issue, which has to do with cognitive
value judgments. This is the topic of the section that follows.
5 Value Judgments and Economic Knowledge
Recall that Becker and Stigler focus on applying \standard economic logic", which consists in as-
suming that \widespread and/or generalized human behavior can be explained by a generalized
calculus of utility-maximizing behavior". In other terms, there is no point in trying to consider
anything other than utility maximization. Hirschman, quite to the contrary, explicitly transcends
such a behavior and considers situations where things that individuals think and want turn out to
be inconsistent with other things that those same individuals think and want.
What is at issue is neither rationality nor information. Although these elements may in°uence
behavior, the di®erence between the above scholars is not centered on them. Bounded rationality
may prevent individuals from making complete sense of what they think and want but, if utility-
maximization is the only rule of the game, consistency is just a matter of correcting one's mistakes
until everything gets straightened out. If the required information is missing, here too we can
conceive of a process whereby, as the available data increases and tends towards completeness,
individuals converge towards their ultimate utility-maximizing goal. Asymmetric information may
prevent optimality but in itself it does not preclude utility-maximizing behavior. The real issue is
why utility-maximization should be the only rule of the game and why it should be possible to know
what information is required. What allows a proper assessment of these assumptions is whether the
economy is conceived of as an open or a closed system22.
The economic system that \standard economic logic" applies to must be closed. Its boundaries
must be identi¯able so that it is possible, potentially, to achieve completeness of information. Were
this not the case, it would not be possible to assess whether the available information is adequate,
i.e. su±cient to formulate reliable expectations. If the absence of closure prevented the relevant
information from being identi¯able, an individual would have to acknowledge that there might be
some information `somewhere out there' that could a®ect her choice but that she does not know
about and that she cannot know about, given the endless extension of the ¯elds of knowledge.
Precisely because information is not circumscribed, it is not possible to judge whether what one
knows is `enough' or not23.
22\An open system is one where not all of the constituent variables and structural relationships are known or
knowable, and thus the boundaries of the system are not known or knowable. ... an open system can be segmented into
subsystems which can be approximated to closed systems for partial analysis, but which are always open organically
to in°uences from other parts of the overall system. While there is no inevitability of order, there are understood to
be underlying forces which can maintain, or restore, order in an indeterminate way." (Dow, 1996, 14)
23\Thus Keynes argued that the con¯dence held in the understanding of the (unquanti¯ed) probability attached
to a proposition would be greater the more weight attached to the probability. Weight increases the more relevant
evidence is available. But this is fundamentally di®erent from the notion of an increase in sample-size for a frequency
distribution calculation. [...] if the evidence reveals wider realms of ignorance than were previously anticipated, the
increased evidence might actually reduce the con¯dence held in the probability judgment. [...] there is the prior
judgment as to whether to recognize new evidence, and whether to recognize its relevance to the probability judgment.
Conventions play a large part in the formation of judgments under uncertainty" (Dow 1996, 19). A more detailed
8Similarly, should there be behavioral rules other than utility-maximization, a rational individual
might have to choose between two possibly inconsistent behaviors. For instance, utility maximization
might be deemed appropriate for an economic context while some other behavioral rule might be
preferred in what concerns religion. In the absence of boundaries that separate each context, one
behavior might interfere with the other, which is precisely what Hirschman suggests.
An open systems view24 implies that systems are interdependent and that their interdependence
changes in space and over time, so that boundaries are bound to change as well. For instance,
people interact within the economy on the basis of views of the world such as those concerning
which distribution is appropriate and socially just. But these views change over time, so that, e.g.
what once was a concern for money income associated to some job is subsequently extended to
welfare provisions associated to a non-market institution. This change in views involves a shift in
the boundaries of the economy25.
Openness implies that you cannot take boundaries for granted. It involves that, in order to deal
with speci¯c issues, you need to choose how to trace the boundaries of the economic system, as well as
those of the discipline required to investigate it. This involves dealing with two interdependent issues:
what happens within the system and how the system interacts with its surrounding environment.
It involves dealing with the complexity associated to the extension of the system in space and over
time and with the number of elements and the types of interaction
Given the above complexity, scholars who follow an open systems approach need to acknowledge
that it is impossible to grasp the economy as a whole. While this supports Ca®µ e's emphasis on
eclecticism, it also shows that what must be included in a single inquiry depends on its relevance
for the questions asked. Hence Ca®µ e's emphasis on policy issues as an integral part of economic
analysis rather that something that merely follows it.
This inevitably requires the formulation of value judgments concerning what is relevant. Rele-
vance refers, here, not only to the appropriateness of the questions { in relation to the moral values
of the inquirer - but to how the inquiry is framed. This is what cognitive value judgments are about.
This takes us back to our discussion about the potential for a common understanding and sharing
of ideas. In the closed system view the ¯eld of inquiry is (claimed to be) given, so that a common
ground for scienti¯c debate is de¯ned a priori, and value judgments relate to moral issues alone.
Following this approach, economists are bound to reach an agreement over technical issues while
maintaining di®erent views as to the appropriateness of one policy rather than another.
The open systems view argues that society, the economy as a part of society and economics as
the discipline that studies the economy, are all subject to change. As society changes, the same
is likely to occur to moral value judgments, so that a convergence may never occur. Hirschman's
approach, which is consistent with the open systems view, suggests, however, that you can argue
about values, so that an economic discourse remains possible.
How does this apply to cognitive value judgments? Based on the discussion above, a cognitive
value judgment re°ects the moral value judgments and the more general views of the world of
whoever tries to make sense of a complex reality. Although, as Becker and Stigler would state, it
\does not permit of direct proof because it is an assertion about the world", it is nevertheless subject
to potential debate. It is possible to debate whether \standard economic logic" is more appropriate
or not, even though a standard criterion of truth is missing.
There is an asymmetry between the two main systemic views, however. Conventional economists,
centered on closed systems, follow the same approach as Becker and Stigler whereby it is best to
rely on \standard economic logic as extensively as possible". Inquiries may resort to other types
of explanation but these accounts are depicted as `ad hoc' and are clearly deemed less satisfactory
from a scienti¯c point of view. The more such inquiries move away from `standard logic' the less
likely will a commonly framed discourse be possible.
discussion of Keynes' open systems approach to economics is in Chick, Dow (2001).
24There are di®erent characterizations of systemic openness, depending on di®erent schools of thought. Here I will
refer to openness only in relation to its implications for Ca®µ e's work. For a detailed analysis see Dow (1996).
25It is interesting to note, in this respect, that Caffµ e (1971b, 184) cites Timbergen's contention that economists
are bound to deal with the ends of the economic system on the grounds that the latter change as a result of how the
boundaries of economic analysis tend to shift over time.
9The same does not hold from the alternative perspective. Open systems theorists can be ex-
tremely con¯dent that their interpretation of the economy is appropriate but, precisely because
openness involves uncertainty, they can never be sure. Openness involves fallibility26. It does not
warrant any claim to true methodological standards and theoretical models. Thus, while conven-
tional economists are likely to consider other approaches wrong on methodological grounds, quite
independently of what their theoretical content may be, open systems approaches can dismiss con-
ventional approaches only on the grounds that they appear to be irrelevant.
6 Ca®µ e's Value Judgments
Ca®µ e's notion of a possible civilization is not the radical dream of a conventional economist. It
is based on the view that the economy is deeply embedded in history. It entails that it may be
di±cult to carry out a desired change, because a historically embedded economy is a much more
complex phenomenon than a systemically closed one. But, because the economy is not the same as
a clockwork, there is no a priori reason for change not to be possible.
Ca®µ e's notion of a possible civilization is not even a moderate version of the palingenetic view.
Precisely because the economy is not a clockwork, change occurs as a process that begins today,
based on all of the constraints associated to the present historical context, and is projected in the
future by drawing on all of the possible worlds envisaged by concerned economists. It emerges from
the historicity of the economy.
Ca®µ e's notion of a possible civilization is strictly related to his methodology. Ca®µ e's non-
mechanistic view of the economy is extended to economics by emphasizing the relevance of un-
certainty. The signi¯cance of any school of economic thought depends on the available evidence
and on how it is situated within the inquiry by the (cognitive value judgments of the) economists.
Given the nature of knowledge in an uncertain environment, all theoretical outlooks may provide
insights and no approach can plausibly claim to be more scienti¯c than others. In this perspective,
the eclecticism that Ca®µ e purports has less to do with a pragmatic approach to di±cult matters
than with a methodological stance towards an intrinsically complex subject.
From a policy-oriented perspective this has important implications. Although any attempt to
model a phenomenon involves some closure and internal consistency requirements, the key issue
is whether such a model allows us to deal with the actual problem it sets out to solve. This
\practical" relevance is a common ground for most economists { independently of their theoretical
and methodological backgrounds - and this is why it is here that Ca®µ e situates his assessment
of di®erent economic explanations. Thus, when he criticizes Coase's approach to social costs, his
concern is not for the internal consistency of the latter's theory but for its inability to account for the
persistence of unpaid costs. Given a commonly acknowledged problem, Coase's response is deemed
inadequate because:
although the remark put forward by Coase is subtly elaborated and although he attempts to stress
its relevance with various examples, it is somewhat di±cult to claim that the capitalist economy
su®ers from an excess amount of measures to correct for \externalities", whereas, if anything, it
su®ers from the absence of such measures.
(Ca®µ e 1978, 46).
Policy relevance is a criterion that may favor dialogue across methodological and theoretical
boundaries but, since systemic openness calls for the interpretation of whatever data is available,
it does not warrant agreement. The implicit denial of truth and of the dualism between perfect
26\While an orthodox economist might also subscribe to fallibilism, it is presented di®erently. Either the approach
is subjectivist, e®ectively allowing for several versions of the `truth', or else the issue of truth is regarded as one which
can in principle be resolved, by internal logic or by empirical testing.What logic and/or testing can reveal, in principle
at least, is understood as objective truth, independent of value systems and beliefs. What heterodox economists
identify as distinguishing schools of thought { beliefs about reality, and values { are regarded by orthodox economists
as `ideology' which, by their understanding of what is involved in economics, is outside economics." (Dow 2008, 16).
10knowledge and total ignorance { thus also of the true-false dualism { is all but reassuring to many
scholars. Although doubt is the typical point of departure for whoever carries out research, Ca®µ e
suggests that it is inherent in a twofold complexity: the complexity of the world, which includes the
evolving social and natural environment, and; the complexity of a discipline (economics) that can
never fully grasp all of the features of that all encompassing and ever changing world. In this sense,
although there are di®erences between Ca®µ e and Herbert Simon, it is possible to refer to Ca®µ e's
view of knowledge as `satis¯cing'.
These issues may de¯nitely support Ca®µ e's contention that a reformist is doomed to solitude. My
impression, however, is that there may be more to the issue than the disquieting nature of Ca®µ e's
approach and the restlessness of those who seek substantive, rather than satis¯cing, knowledge.
More speci¯cally, I believe that a problem may be identi¯ed in the relation he establishes between
value judgments and eclecticism.
As I mentioned above, Ca®µ e always stressed the importance of value judgments in economic
analysis. They are relevant not only in that they are the motives that underlie the pursuit of
knowledge. They are also the viewpoints that frame and make sense of any economic inquiry. But,
precisely because value judgments do not merely cause an inquiry but also frame it, di®erent value
judgments are likely to lead to di®erent views of the economy. So the problem is how these di®erent
views can lead to a common understanding. When Ca®µ e mentions the need for eclecticism, he
acknowledges that no inquiry can be all-encompassing and that the results of di®erent inquiries may
complement each other. But how can this happen? In order for integration to occur, there must be
a common denominator for all of the inquiries. They must be compatible, otherwise we would be
confronted with a relativistic view of the discipline whereby `anything holds'. From the perspective
of our discussion, this would imply that Ca®µ e's reliance on ideas would be doomed to failure.
Let us return to the above discussion about value judgments. We mentioned two approaches.
The conventional one assumes that moral value judgments do not preclude a common understanding
of economics as a science. A standard economic logic applies so that, even if points of departure
di®er, the outcomes of all inquiries are bound to converge within a commonly accepted framework.
The alternative, heterodox, approach assumes away a standard logic and claims that how one con-
ducts an inquiry also depends on value judgments. Thus, a common understanding is possible in the
conventional view, although just in terms of `positive analysis', while the heterodox view acknowl-
edges that the existence of approaches based on contrasting cognitive value judgments may lead to
incommensurable outcomes27. However, contrary to the conventional approach, value judgments in
the heterodox approach are not like preferences: they can be subject to dispute. From this heterodox
perspective the outcomes of economic inquiries need not converge towards a common understanding.
What is required for a convergence to occur is a preliminary understanding over the premises { thus
the value judgments - of the inquiry.
Let us now consider Ca®µ e's views. As the discussion of his overall approach and outlook suggests,
he was very critical of the conventional approach and closer to the heterodox one. However, the
relation between cognitive value judgments and the convergence of ideas remains an open issue in his
treatment of economics. He is undoubtedly of the view that there is no \privileged conception that
encompasses the premises of all further development" (Ca®µ e 1978, 17) and that it is important to
appreciate the valid contribution of all schools of thought. What he tends to neglect is that schools
of thought may di®er not only in terms of the theories they purport but of the methodology they
resort to. Consider, in this respect, Ca®µ e's discussion of Marshall.
According to Ca®µ e (1971b, 76; my emphasis).
the historical importance of the Marshallian perspective on public action in the economy lies in
the internal critique of the ultimate outcomes of a competitive state of equilibrium, a critique that is
carried out according to the logic of economic reasoning and not by resorting to arguments external to
it, which are typical of social reformers or of authors who are inclined to economic heterodoxy. This
point should be regarded basically on conceptual grounds, not because of its immediate practical
27Incommensurability applies even to language, since the same word may be assigned di®erent meanings according
to the value judgments underlying the analysis. See Chick and Dow (2001) for a more detailed discussion of this
issue.
11implications.
Here, the suggested distinction is between the logic of economic reasoning, which is the one
centered on the analysis of a competitive state of equilibrium, and the logic of authors who are
inclined to economic heterodoxy, which is external to economic reasoning. It implies that, although
economic heterodoxy should be appreciated in so far as it contributes to the advancement of economic
knowledge, the criterion whereby all contributions are assessed is the orthodox one. But this is
tantamount to assigning to the orthodox approach a privileged position on methodological, if not
strictly theoretical, grounds.
Let us consider another example. As I argued above, according to Ca®µ e, economic theory must
meet the needs that arise from society, and the separation between the economy and the rest of
society cannot but be arti¯cial. This point clearly emerges in his discussion of Pigou's notion of
welfare. Once he has clearly summarized all of the logical steps that lead to Pigou's distinction
between economic welfare and overall welfare, Ca®µ e stresses that such a distinction is the inevitable
result of a compromise, since a more rigorous solution is not available in practice. In so doing he
acknowledges that the two concepts cannot be separated other than by resorting to a convention
(see Ca®µ e 1971b, 90). However, when he turns to Hicks' (1939; 1959) critique of the distinction,
whereby it does not adequately take into account the non-economic e®ects of policy measures, he
dismisses it on the grounds that Pigou was well aware of these shortcomings28.
My impression is that such a dismissal is, at the very least, hasty. Quite independently of
what Hicks had to say about the whole matter, the compromise underlying the distinction between
economic welfare and overall welfare required not only the identi¯cation but also an assessment of
the assumptions that allowed it. Based on the above discussion, such an assessment may re°ect two
situations. The ¯rst one { which is consistent with a closed system view - is that, once economic
welfare µ a la Pigou is assessed, the analysis can be extended to overall welfare by proceeding in
a (roughly) additive manner. In this perspective, the distinction holds despite possible (minor)
shortcomings. The assumptions underlying the compromise are of a \heuristic" type (Musgrave
1981), i.e. they provide for a temporary simpli¯cation, which will be abandoned in subsequent steps
of the inquiry.
In the second situation { which re°ects an open systems view - the interdependence between
economic and non economic welfare is so important that any attempt to proceed stepwise from
economic to overall welfare may undermine the overall assessment. Social costs are a case in point.
If they basically amount to exceptions, relative to the general functioning of the market, and can
be expressed in money terms, they can be accommodated within the framework outlined by Pigou.
Quite to the contrary, if social costs are a key feature of capitalism and cannot (always) be expressed
in money terms, it is doubtful that one can ¯rst measure income and then adjust it for such costs.
In this case, the assumptions underlying the compromise are \domain" assumptions (ibid.): they
cannot be abandoned if the theory is to hold29.
By dismissing the Hicksian critique, Ca®µ e is implicitly assuming that it is the ¯rst situation that
holds. However, Ca®µ e's treatment of social costs is much more consistent with the second situation.
Ca®µ e is extremely careful to identify all the (implicit) assumptions that underlie a theory or a
model, and he acknowledges that they should be assessed with respect to the internal consistency
of the theory and to what appears to be the world in its concrete reality. However, here just as
in the Marshallian example, he tends to neglect that those assumptions should also be assessed in
relation to meta-assumptions { cognitive value judgments - concerning how that same world can be
partitioned in order to be investigated.
This unsolved methodological inconsistency makes dialogue between Ca®µ e and other economists
rather di±cult. Consider, for instance, Ca®µ e's (1976a) claim that the IMF should respect what
institutional and political peculiarities its member countries choose, rather than subordinate them
to its policy prescriptions. Viewed from the conventional approach, this appears to be less an
economic policy contention than a political statement, i.e. one that lies beyond economic analysis.
28\Since Pigou would have never wished to contrast these claims in any way, the substantial sterility of this polemic
is evident." (Caffµ e 1971b, 98).
29Caffµ e's (1978) emphasis on Kapp (1963) suggests that he believes that it is the second situation that holds.
12This is because, if one follows a closed systems approach, institutional and political peculiarities
are, at the very least, auxiliary elements with respect to the logic of economic reasoning. They are
not relevant as such but only in relation to their e®ect on economic goals such as income growth or
price stability. Quite to the contrary, when viewed in an open systems perspective, the institutional
and political peculiarities of a country { how it chooses to conduct its activities { are on the same
standing as income growth or any other strictly economic goal, so that the latter cannot be pursued
by just disregarding the former.
A conventional economist is likely not to deem Ca®µ e's contention as downright wrong; she will
simply consider it as irrelevant in that it is extra-economic. What happens to be a key element in
Ca®µ e's discussion of the IMF { that no `technical' argument can transcend a country's freedom to
organize itself as it deems best - will not be given its due importance because it will be considered
a value judgment, thus not subject to debate, just like preferences. Quite to the contrary, a proper
assessment of Ca®µ e's discussion would require the acknowledgment that he is, albeit implicitly,
formulating assumptions on the nature of the economy that are altogether di®erent from those of
the conventional view and that the cognitive value judgments that underlie those assumptions should
be reasoned about, rather than just be accepted or rejected.
It is most likely that the lack of clarity over these issues made the solitude of a reformist like
Ca®µ e even greater. Unfortunately, even though history seems to have vindicated a great deal of his
ideas, this lack of clarity still needs to be overcome.
7 Conclusions
There are many reasons why a reformist such as Ca®µ e should feel isolated by his colleagues. Leaving
aside those that have to do with (the defense of) vested interests or with a narrow view of the
function that an economist should have in society, some of the reasons relate to the creation and
assessment of ideas. These are the reasons that Ca®µ e would be most concerned about, since it is
ideas that \soon or late, ... are dangerous for good or evil.".
Ca®µ e was very critical of the misleading, if reassuring, reliance on mechanistic views of the econ-
omy and on scientistic views of economics. Ca®µ e contrasted the pretense to an objective economic
science by stressing that the separation between positive and normative analysis was inappropri-
ate. Following Gunnar Myrdal (1953; see also Myrdal 1998), he pointed out that both economics
and economic policy were disciplines based on the preliminary formulation of value judgments. His
emphasis on the complexity associated to history made him focus on all opportunities for social
improvement, regardless of what was presumed to happen in the long run. When he pointed out
that
The e®ort to eliminate these shortcomings [of economic development on income distribution],
when it helps to improve the living conditions within the economic system for a reasonable space of
time, appears to be worthwhile, independently of what the ¯nal destiny of the system may be.
(Ca®µ e 1978, 132)
he was stressing that he was less concerned with the fate of the economy than with the dramatic
issues that had to be solved. This lack of concern was polemically addressed both to those who
believed that no substantial improvement was possible unless everything changed and to those who
believed that economic compatibilities had to be put to the fore, despite their costs in terms of
grievous social consequences.
Value judgments re°ect a view of the world. They may focus on two distinct { although not
separate { issues. The ¯rst one is `what the economy ought to be'; I referred to these as moral
value judgments. The second issue is `what economic analysis ought to be'; I referred to these as
cognitive value judgments. Moral value judgments are the motives that lead to an inquiry as well
as the criteria that underlie a policy choice. But what frames an inquiry is not only the question
you ask but also how you choose to seek an answer. In a complex world, where uncertainty a®ects
what and how you learn, cognitive value judgments are the views that frame an inquiry.
13Ca®µ e's con¯dence that ideas would eventually prevail over vested interests was based on a view of
economics as a unitary edi¯ce where all approaches could be ¯tted. But this required the contribu-
tions of di®erent schools of thought potentially to complement each other. A common methodological
framework was called for, quite independently of the di®erent value judgments that each economist
had. I have argued, however, that reconciling the unitary edi¯ce with theories based on di®erent
(cognitive) value judgments is rather problematic. One possibility is to identify a common crite-
rion to assess di®erent theories. This is what underlies the \standard economic logic" that Becker
and Stigler refer to. It is also what Ca®µ e seems to have in mind when he refers to the \logic of
economic reasoning". The problem with this criterion is that it leaves out much of what Ca®µ e him-
self believed, e.g. the relevance of history. Another possibility is to acknowledge that the variety
of cognitive value judgments underlying the existing schools of thought is bound to determine in-
commensurable theories. This criterion undermines Ca®µ e's belief that economics is a one and only
edi¯ce.
A third criterion consists in acknowledging that the variety of cognitive value judgments may
lead to incommensurable theoretical frameworks but that dialogue may still occur if there is clarity
as to the methodologies used. This involves making explicit what premises { i.e. what cognitive
value judgments - hold. It need not lead to any theoretical convergence, but it will nonetheless
breach the incommunicability between di®erent schools of thought. Furthermore, in so far as the
systemic openness of both the economy and of economics is acknowledged, it will favor awareness of
fallibility, thus also of the potential gains from dialogue.
The latter criterion is consistent with Ca®µ e's general approach to economics and it may well be
promising at a time when, as Bigo (2008, 527) points out, authors such as Friedman and Hahn have
acknowledged that modern mainstream economics, with its logic of economic reasoning, \is not too
successful at providing insight" but, at the same time, the existing alternatives remain a minority.
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